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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 980359-CA 
v. : 
RONALD LEROY HARPER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for operation of a clandestine laboratory, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5 (Supp. 1998), in the 
Second Judicial District Court in and for Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Michael D. Lyon, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented on appeal are: 
1. Has petitioner demonstrated that his trial counsel was ineffective? If a claim 
of ineffectiveness is raised for the first time on appeal, it will reviewed only "if the trial 
record is adequate to permit decision of the issue . . . ." State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 
1027, 1029 (Utah 1991). 
2. Was the trial court's denial of defendant's request for a jury instruction 
regarding accomplice testimony an abuse of discretion? An instruction to an 
accomplice's testimony with caution "is entirely discretionary with the court, and [the 
reviewing court] will reverse only when [the trial court] has abused that discretion." 
State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 781 (Utah 1986); Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7(2) (1995). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions and statutes are determinative of the 
issues in this case: 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7 (1995) 
(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an 
accomplice. 
(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to the jury may be given 
to the effect that such uncorroborated testimony should be viewed with 
caution, and such an instruction shall be given if the trial judge finds the 
testimony of the accomplice to be self contradictory, uncertain or 
improbable. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Ronald Leroy Harper, was charged with one count of operating a 
clandestine laboratory, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5 
(Supp. 1998) (R. 1). Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of the offense 
charged (R. 160-61, 175: 142). The trial court sentenced defendant to a statutory five-
to-life term of imprisonment in the Utah State Prison (R. 160-61, 176: 5). Following 
defendant's timely filing of a notice of appeal (R. 165), the Utah Supreme Court poured 
this case over to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 10, 1997, at little after 11:00 p.m., the Weber-Morgan Narcotics 
strike force executed a search warrant on 2214 Tyler Avenue in Ogden, Utah, the 
residence of Ray Howe, a methamphetamine user previously convicted of possession 
and distribution of controlled substances (R. 174: 13, 26-27, 70-73).l Members of the 
strike force first entered through the front door of the home (R. 174: 74). Other 
members of the strike force were waiting out back and entered through the back door 
when they heard that nobody was found upstairs (R. 174:74). Inside, the police found 
defendant, Patty Jepsen (defendant's girlfriend), Jeff Hill, Ray Howe, Sherrie Smith 
1
 The affidavit in support of the search warrant, unchallenged in any motion to 
suppress, supported by numerous tips from a variety of informants, indicated that the 
Howe residence was the base of operations for a methamphetamine lab operated by 
defendant (R. 55-60). 
3 
(Ray Howe's girlfriend) and Terry Smith (Sherrie's brother) (R.174: 18-19). 
Deputy Doug Coleman, the field supervisor of the Weber-Morgan Narcotics 
Strike Force, entered through the back door of the residence and saw three individuals 
standing at the base of the stairs to the basement (R. 174: 74-76). Deputy Coleman 
ordered the three individuals, who were not particularly cooperative, to get on the 
ground with their hands up (R. 174: 75). Detective Shawn Hamblin came down the 
stairs behind Deputy Coleman. As Detective Hamblin was working his way to the 
three individuals, he noticed someone in a red shirt, later positively identified as 
defendant, come from the lab area, and then run and hide behind some ductwork (R. 
174: 91-92, 97, 99-100).2 Detective Hamblin commanded several times that defendant 
show himself and get down on the ground (R. 174: 91, 97). Detective Hamblin then 
noticed another male, Jeff Hill, also hiding behind the ductwork (R. 174: 92). 
After the officers' persistent yelling, both defendant and Hill lay down on the 
ground. They were then handcuffed and separated (R. 174: 92-93). Defendant initially 
lied to Detective Mike Donehoo, stating that his name was David Flowers (R.175: 44, 
91). However, Detective Donehoo had brought a photograph of defendant with him 
and knew defendant's correct name, Ronald Leroy Harper, which defendant thereafter 
2
 Sergeant Tony Huemiller also noticed a person with a red shirt coming from 
the lab area. Defendant was the only person at the house who was wearing a red shirt 
(R. 174: 97, 99). 
4 
acknowledged (R. 175: 44, 81). At the time of his arrest, defendant was on probation 
for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute (R. 175: 88, 96-97). 
The methamphetamine lab was discovered in the basement and to the right, the 
first room around the corner, where defendant was first seen by detectives (R.174: 97, 
100; R. 175: 27). According to Jeff Hill, the lab was only a couple of feet away 
whichever way one turned in the basement (R. 175: 44). Its presence was inescapable 
without even seeing it from the strong odor of chemicals which burned Deputy 
Coleman's eyes and lungs (R. 174: 77, 79-80, 85-86). Ron Larsen, agent with the 
federal Drug Enforcement Agency, could smell the chemicals from the kitchen, directly 
above the basement (R. 175: 4-6). Don Thurgood, chemist with the Utah State Crime 
Laboratory, found chemicals and numerous pieces of equipment indicating an 
operational methamphetamine lab, including beakers, glass bottles, a scale containing 
methamphetamine residue, hydrochloric acid (a component needed to make 
methamphetamine), and ephedrine (a precursor in the manufacture of 
methamphetamine) (R. 174: 101-03, 105-06, 113-20).3 Mr. Thurgood's general 
observations of laboratory equipment and chemicals and his opinion that the basement 
3
 Mr. Thurgood also testified that it is common not to find usable fingerprints 
on clandestine lab equipment, as in this case, because the acids and bases used in the 
manufacture of methamphetamine tend to dry the skin, eliminating the oils necessary 
for the transfer of fingerprints (R. 174: 106-07). None of the surfaces tested in this 
case displayed fingerprints of sufficient quality to undertake an analysis or identify 
anyone (R. 174: 128-29). 
5 
area harbored a clandestine drug lab was were corroborated by Ron Larsen and Lynn 
Horspool, agent with the Utah State Investigations Bureau (R. 175: 4, 20, 26, 28, 30-
34). Additionally, Agent Horspool stated that Mr. Thurgood's discovery of 
methamphetamine and ephedrine together in a jar indicated that the chemicals were then 
approaching the end of the "cooking" process (R. 175: 26). 
Immediately following the execution of the warrant, Ray Howe confessed an 
illicit arrangement with defendant and directed agents to drugs in his personal 
possession before any search uncovered them and before any kind offer was made to 
him (R. 174: 13, 21-22).4 Howe told Detective Donehoo that he allowed defendant to 
make methamphetamine in his basement in return for a fourth of the methamphetamine 
that was manufactured (R. 174: 13-14). Prior to the raid, the lab was up and operating 
for about 6 to 8 months (R. 174: 26-27). In the two weeks prior to the raid, defendant 
was at Howe's house ten days, never to visit but rather only to manufacture 
methamphetamine-he and defendant talked about the manufacturing of 
methamphetamine all the time (R. 174: 15-16). Howe also implicated Jeff Hill, stating 
that Hill was defendant's gopher, purchasing phosphorus, distilled water and muriatic 
acid and hauling trash from the lab (R. 174: 17-18). 
4
 In exchange for Howe's testimony, charges against him for possession of a 
methamphetamine lab and possession of methamphetamine within 1000 feet of a school 
or a park were reduced from first to second degree felonies (R. 174: 24). 
6 
Jeff Hill had also been previously convicted of operating a clandestine 
methamphetamine lab and was currently serving time in the Utah State Prison for a 
parole violation (R. 174: 34). He testified that he had known defendant for a couple 
years, and he corroborated the arrangement referenced by Howe that he had with 
defendant (R. 174: 35-37).5 This arrangement primarily consisted of Hill's purchasing 
supplies that were used to make the methamphetamine (R. 174: 35-37). Defendant 
would provide Hill with a list of the supplies and ingredients that were needed (R. 174: 
37). Occasionally, Hill would help defendant by taking the garbage outside (R. 174: 
43). In return Hill would receive drugs for his participation in the operation (R. 174: 
37, 41). On the night the warrant was executed, defendant was "pulling" ephedrine, a 
precursor of methamphetamine, and Hill was wearing gloves to protect himself from 
the harmful chemicals used in manufacturing methamphetamine as he disposed of them 
in the garbage (R. 174: 42-44). 
Defendant was on probation for possession of methamphetamine with intent to 
distribute at the time of his arrest (R. 175: 88, 96-97). He testified that he had known 
Howe about six to eight months prior to the execution of the warrant and had been to 
his house only a couple of times (R. 175: 82). He claimed that when the warrant was 
5
 In exchange for Hill's testimony, a charge against him for possession of a 
methamphetamine lab was reduced to a second degree felony and a charge of 
absconding was dismissed (R. 174: 47-48, 51-25). 
7 
executed he had been at Howe's home for only about fifteen minutes and only to collect 
$50 for a lawn mower he had previously delivered to Howe (R. 175: 82-83, 90). At 
the time of his arrest he denied to Detective Donehoo his true identity and his 
acquaintance with any of the people then present at the residence, and at trial he denied 
knowing of the presence of a methamphetamine lab or smelling any chemicals in the 
Howe residence (R. 175: 44-45, 86-87). However, in addition to contrary testimony 
previously set forth, defendant admitted at trial that he knew Jeff Hill and implied that 
he had been acquainted with Sherrie Smith and her brother Terry (R. 175: 90, 93). 
Sherrie testified that she had met defendant three months prior to the execution of the 
warrant, that defendant had been to Howe's house more than ten times in the two 
weeks preceding the execution of the warrant, and that on the night in question 
defendant had arrived at the house between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m., several hours 
before the execution of the warrant (R. 175: 99-102).6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I Because defendant has failed to provide any evidence whatsoever about 
what witnesses should have been called or what they would have testified to at trial, 
6
 Further bearing on defendant's credibility are the following facts adduced at 
trial: (1) defendant claimed he could not recall if his prior drug conviction was for 
possession of methamphetamine or possession with intent to distribute, or that he was 
on probation for a second degree felony, arguing that his attorney had handled the 
whole affair, and (2) defendant claimed he did know that he had been assigned a parole 
officer in connection with his prior conviction (R. 175: 88-91). 
8 
this Court should decline to consider his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Alternatively, defendant has failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel for 
lack of a supporting record. 
POINT II The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a cautionary 
instruction on accomplice testimony because such testimony was substantially 
confirmed by independent sources. In view of instructions equivalent to that proffered 
by defendant, and defense counsel's alerting the jury to the accomplices' interest in 
testifying against defendant, any error in refusing to give the requested instruction was, 
at most, harmless. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO IDENTIFY ANY 
UNCALLED WITNESSES OR TO PROVIDE THE SUBSTANCE OF 
THEIR ALLEGED TESTIMONY, THIS COURT SHOULD 
DECLINE TO CONSIDER HIS CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
"[An appellate court] review[s] a challenge of ineffective assistance of counsel 
by first determining whether counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, 
determining whether the deficient performance prejudiced defendant. State v. 
Severance, 828 P.2d 1066, 1070 (Utah App. 1992) (citing Strickland v. Washington. 
446 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)). 
"Proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but 
must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook. 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993). 
Thus, when a defendant raises an ineffective assistance claim for the first time on 
appeal, the claim should be reviewed only "if the . . . record is adequate to permit 
decision of the issue." State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991). 
Further, an appellate court will "assume the regularity of the proceedings below when 
appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal." State v. Blubaugh. 904 P.2d 
688, 699 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied. 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996) (citing Jolivet v. 
Cook. 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989)). In State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 289 
(Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
When a defendant predicates error to [an appellate court], he has 
the duty and responsibility of supporting such allegation by an adequate 
record. Absent that record, defendant's assignment of error stands as a 
unilateral allegation which the review court has no power to determine. 
This Court simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its 
existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the record. 
Id. at 293 (citations omitted).7 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel 
7
 See also rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure ("The argument 
shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial 
court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on."); 
State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (refusing to consider inadequately 
briefed claim under rule 24(a)(9), and stating "that this court is not "'a depository in 
which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research'") (quoting 
State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)) (original citation omitted). 
10 
in failing to subpoena any witnesses in his behalf. App. Br. at 8. However, because 
defendant has failed to assert or provide this Court with any record in support of his 
claim, this Court should decline to even consider it.8 Alternatively, defendant's claim 
fails for lack of record support. See State v. Arguelles. 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996) 
(rejecting ineffective assistance upon claim counsel prevented the defendant from 
testifying where neither the record nor the defendant's brief indicated what his 
testimony would have been if he had testified); State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 183, 188 
n.26 (Utah 1990) (finding that the defendant had failed to show prejudice in his 
counsel's failure to investigate a particular witness because "[he had] not provided this 
court with any evidence concerning what [the witness] would have testified to if he had 
been called during trial"); State v. Callahan. 866 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah App. 1993) 
Additionally, defendant has at no point moved for an evidentiary hearing, 
pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to create a record 
establishing ineffective assistance of counsel. Moreover, based on the facts of this 
case, it seems improbable that defendant could create such a record. See State v. 
Callahan, 866 P.2d 590, 593-94 (Utah App. 1993) (rejecting claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel where "essentially every participant in or observer of the events 
culminating in defendant's arrest testified at trial). Although neither Patty Jepsen, 
defendant's girlfriend, or Terry Smith testified, it is apparent that these witnesses were 
known to defense counsel and were likely rejected for strategic reasons, i.e, Jepsen 
acknowledges in a letter to the trial court that she too was a drug user (R. 48), and 
defendant nowhere suggests that either witness would have been helpful. See State v. 
Crosby. 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996) (the reviewing court will give trial counsel 
wide latitude in making tactical decisions and will not question such decisions unless 
there is no reasonable basis supporting them) (citing Taylor v. Warden. 905 P.2d 277, 
282 (Utah 1995)). 
11 
(summarily disposing of claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where neither the 
record nor defendant's brief identified witnesses that counsel failed to subpoena or 
alleged the substance of their testimony); Severance. 828 P.2d at 1070 (finding no 
reasonable probability of a different result at trial where the record did not indicate 
whether a witness would have testified more favorably at trial, and evidence against the 
defendant was overwhelming). In sum, this Court should reject defendants claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY 
INSTRUCTION ON ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY. 
Defendant argues that the trial court prejudicially erred in refusing to grant his 
request for an instruction directing the jury to view with caution the allegedly 
uncorroborated testimony of Howe and Hill, defendant's two accomplices. App. Br. at 
9. The claim fails because (1) independent evidence corroborated the accomplices' 
testimony, (2) the accomplices' testimony was not "self contradictory, uncertain, or 
improbable," and (3) even if the court should have given the instruction, the error was 
harmless because the accomplices' credibility in this case was rigorously challenged 
and other instructions fully informed the jury to weigh any testimony in light of the 
12 
witnesses' biases and interests.9 
On appeal, defendant argues that Howe's and Hill's testimony, to wit: that 
defendant arranged with them to run a methamphetamine lab, was uncorroborated 
because no evidence, other than his presence in the home, connected him with the 
methamphetamine lab. App. Br. at 10.10 However, contrary to defendant's claim, 
other evidence corroborated that defendant was not merely present at Howe's home, 
but was an active participant in the operation of the methamphetamine lab at the time 
9
 The transcript of defendant's requested instruction, ensuing argument and the 
court's ruling (R: 175: 107-111) is attached at Addendum A. 
10
 In the trial court, defendant requested the following instruction, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7 (1995): 
A defendant may be found guilty on the uncorroborated testimony of an 
accomplice; however, such testimony should be viewed with caution, and 
the jury should consider the motives of the accomplice and the benefits 
the accomplice may stand t o gain by testifying in determining credibility 
and the weight such testimony should be given. 
(R. 101) (attached at Addendum B). 
In support of his requested instruction, defendant argued that the testimony of 
defendant's alleged accomplices, Ray Howe and Jeff Hill, was uncorroborated because 
"corroboration" required independent physical evidence, such as fingerprints, to link 
him to the methamphetamine lab, which was absent in this case (R.175: 107-109). 
Defendant has not claimed on appeal that "corroboration" must attain so high a level of 
probativeness. In any case, authority cited by the State makes clear that corroborative 
evidence need not be the substantial equivalent of evidence independently proving 
defendant's guilt. 
13 
the police executed the warrant. 
Section 77-17-7 permits a trial court, in its discretion, to give a cautionary 
instruction when a prosecution is based exclusively on the testimony of an accomplice 
and the accomplice's testimony is uncorroborated.11 In State v. Kerekes. 622 P.2d 
1161 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
This Court has previously stated that the corroboration need not go to all 
the material facts as testified to by the accomplice, nor need it be 
sufficient in itself to support a conviction. However, the corroborating 
evidence must connect the defendant with the commission of the offense 
and be consistent with his guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. 
kL at 1167 (citations omitted). See State v. Neelev. 748 P.2d 1091, 1096 (Utah 1988) 
(no abuse of discretion in trial court's refusing cautionary instruction where 
"[accomplice's] testimony was not the only evidence linking defendants to the crime, 
and . . .other evidence substantially corroborated [accomplice's] testimony"). See also 
Webster's New World Dictionary 332 (College ed. 1956) ("Corroborate" means "to 
strengthen, to make more certain, to confirm, to support"). Thus, corroborating 
11
 Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7 (1995) provides: 
(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an 
accomplice. 
(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to the jury may be given 
to the effect that such uncorroborated testimony should be viewed with 
caution, and such an instruction shall be given if the trial judge finds the 
testimony of the accomplice to be self contradictory, uncertain or 
improbable. 
14 
evidence need not be actual physical evidence connecting to the offense, but merely 
evidence that confirms or supports the connection.12 
On the facts of this case the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Ray 
Howe and Jeff Hill's inculpatory testimony was corroborated by other witnesses' 
testimony.13 The testimony of law enforcement officials undisputedly established that at 
the time police executed the warrant there was a methamphetamine lab in Howe's 
basement (R. 174: 101-03, 105-06, 113-20; 175: 4, 20, 26, 28, 30-34), that it was then 
12
 That "corroboration" does not amount to evidence virtually sufficient to 
convict is further supported by Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953), the predecessor 
statute to section 77-17-7, which provided: 
A conviction shall not be had on the testimony of an accomplice, 
unless he is corroborated by other evidence, which in itself and without 
the aid of the testimony of the accomplice tends to connect the defendant 
with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration shall not be 
sufficient, if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the 
circumstances thereof. [Emphasis added.] 
13
 Defendant does not specifically challenge with legal analysis or authority the 
trial court's additional finding that the accomplices also corroborated their own 
testimony (R. 175: 111). Because defendant has failed to adequately brief this issue, 
see State v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984), and because other witnesses 
sufficiently corroborated the accomplices' testimony as set out below, this Court need 
not address this issue. However, the State acknowledges in passing that the trial 
court's view that accomplices may corroborate their own testimony, although not yet 
addressed in Utah, is contrary to the general view. See 29A Am Jur 2d Evidence § 
1490 (1994); Commonwealth v. Almeida. 452 A.2d 512, 516 (Pa. 1982) (even where a 
conviction may be based on uncorroborated accomplice testimony, it is "reversible 
error for a trial judge to allow a jury to infer from his instructions, by negative 
inference or otherwise, that the testimony of one accomplice may be used to 
corroborate that of another accomplice"). 
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in actual operation (R. 174: 119; 175: 26), and that from its effect on the eyes and 
lungs and the odor of the chemicals in other parts of the house, its presence was 
unmistakable (R. 174: 77, 79-80, 85-86; 175: 4-6) . Detectives Hamblin and 
Huemiller observed defendant and Hill run from the lab area and then attempt to hide 
behind the ductwork (R. 174: 91-92, 97, 99-100). Officer Donehoo testified that 
defendant attempted to conceal his identity by giving him a false name (R. 48). See 
State v. Dvett. 199 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1948) (impliedly holding that giving false 
name consistent with criminal intent). Additionally, both defendant himself at trial and 
Sherrie Smith confirmed Howe's and Hill's collective testimony that defendant had 
been to the Howe residence frequently and, despite his denials at the crime scene, knew 
the other people discovered on the premises, most of whom were either 
methamphetamine users or manufacturers (R. 48, 174: 26-27, 34; 175: 90, 93, 99-
102; R. 175: 99). Also, Smith testified that although she had never seen defendant 
exchange drugs with Howe, she had observed them in possession of drugs after the 
drugs had been exchanged (R. 175: 100). In sum, this testimony independently 
confirmed or supported the accomplices' testimony and "tended to connect with the 
commission of the offense," justifying the trial court's denial of defendant's requested 
instruction. 
Furthermore, it is evident that a mandatory cautionary instruction is not required 
in this case. "Section 77-17-7 states that a cautionary instruction must be given [/the 
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accomplice testimony is 'uncorroborated' and 'the trial judge finds the testimony of the 
accomplice to be self contradictory, uncertain or improbable.'" State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1226 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Defendant has not 
argued that a cautionary instruction was mandated by the circumstances, see Amicone. 
689 P.2d at 1344, and the record plainly does not contain a factual basis for requiring a 
mandatory instruction. 
Finally, even if the trial court did err in refusing the proffered instruction, the 
error was harmless. In Dunn, the court found harmless accomplice testimony 
concerning the charge of reckless manslaughter where the jury was made aware that the 
accomplice had a motive to testify favorably for the prosecution, the jury was instructed 
to take into account bias, interest, or motive in assessing credibility, the accomplice 
was repeatedly impeached, defense counsel underscored the accomplice's dubious 
credibility in closing argument, and the jury was further instructed that "if you believe 
any witness has wilfully testified falsely . . . you are at liberty to disregard the whole of 
the testimony of such witness." Dunn, 850 P.2d 1226-28. 
This case is indistinguishable from Dunn: (1) defense counsel repeatedly and 
extensively challenged Howe and Hill on their having received favorable plea bargains 
in exchange for their testimony (R. 174: 24-30, 47-50, 66-68); (2) in lieu of giving 
defendant's requested instruction, the trial court noted that it had instructed the jury to 
consider the credibility of witnesses and that it should consider a witness's bias, 
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interests, and motives;14 (3) on cross examination, defense counsel effectively 
challenged Howe's and Hill's credibility;15 (4) in both opening and closing argument 
defense counsel argued at length the accomplices' past criminal history, the favorable 
deals they had received in exchange for their testimony, and their motives to lie (R. 
174: 9-11, 125-30); and (5) the trial court also instructed the jury that if it believed a 
witness had lied, it could disregard the witness's entire testimony (Jury instruction #15, 
14
 Jury instruction #16 stated: 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the 
weight of the evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and 
credibility of the witnesses, you have a right to take into consideration any 
biases, any interest in the result, and any motive or lack of motive to 
testify fairly. You may consider the witnesses' conduct while testifying 
before you, the reasonableness of their statements, their apparent 
frankness or candor, or the want of it, their opportunity to know, their 
ability to understand, and their capacity to remember. You should 
consider these matters you believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or 
accuracy of the witnesses' statements. 
(R. 122, attached at Addendum C). 
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 Specifically, defense counsel elicited from Howe that he was a 
methamphetamine user with past drug convictions and probation violations who had 
curried favor with the police by immediately disclosing his involvement and personal 
drug stash which could not be hidden from the police given that police would search the 
entire premises anyhow (R. 174: 25-32). Defense counsel elicited from Hill that he too 
was a methamphetamine user with a lengthy history of convictions and probation 
violations, who initially lied to the police about his identity and who evaded 
responsibility for being a methamphetamine manufacturer (R. 174: 52-54, 56-58). 
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R. 121).l6 
In sum, given that independent evidence corroborated the accomplices' 
testimony, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give the jury a 
cautionary instruction, and any error in failing to so instruct the jury was harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that 
defendant's conviction be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not 
request that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue. 
^ < 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / f day of October, 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
16 Jury instruction #15 provides: 
If you believe any witness has willfully testified falsely as to any 
material matter, you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness, 
except as that witness my have been corroborated by other credible 
evidence. 
(R. 121, attached at Addendum C). 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
MR. RETALLICK: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Here's the instruction. 
MR. RETALLICK: I have a copy here, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RETALLICK: It's based on language out of Utah 
Code Annotated Section 77-17-7, and also based on the 
Supreme Court of Utah decision of State versus George Ray 
Neeley, 748 P. 2d 1091, decision from January of 1988. 
The instruction we are requesting is that a 
defendant -- this is on -- concerning testimony of an 
accomplice: A defendant may be found guilty on the 
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice; however, such 
testimony should be viewed with caution, and the jury should 
consider the motives of the accomplice and the benefits the 
accomplice may stand to gain by testifying in determining 
the credibility and the weight such testimony should be 
given. 
I feel that based on the fact that we have two 
individuals, co-defendants, testifying against my client, 
that they do not necessarily corroborate each other's 
testimony. That I believe the corroboration aspect has to 
be some independent evidence, for example, actual physical 
evidence linking my client to the operation or possession of 
precursor material or the operation of the lab. I don't 
believe simply the testimony of the individuals is 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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sufficient to sustain the conviction, and that's why I ask 
for this jury instruction to be given, 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Saunders, would you like to respond, please? 
MR. SAUNDERS: Your Honor, I think under the 
reading of the statute, it's discretionary with the Court, 
first of all, whether you give this instruction. And I 
don't think that this instruction is warranted in this case 
because I do not believe that the testimony of the 
co-defendant, or even both co-defendants, is uncorroborated 
in this case. I think that they corroborate each other. 
There is corroboration through the testimony that was given 
through the Strike Force agents, through the testimony of 
Sheri Smith, some things that she testified to about the 
defendant. 
I think evidence received from the defendant when he 
testified in some of the answers that he gave could be 
corroboration when considered with the statements that he's 
made before. 
So I don't think that the instruction is warranted 
under this case. I think that other instruction the Court 
has proposed adequately tells the jury about how they should 
view each witnesses' testimony and to look for biases in 
that and consider the motives of the people that are 
testifying, and I think that is sufficient. 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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1 THE COURT: Thank you. 
2 Any response that you wish to make? 
3 MR. RETALLICK: Yes. He indicated that Sheri Smith 
4 corroborated some of the information. The only thing she 
5 testified about is the defendant being present in the house 
6 on more occasions than what the defendant admitted himself. 
7 She never testified that she ever saw the defendant in 
8 possession of narcotics. She testified she doesn't -- was 
9 unaware that he was involved or that there was even a lab in 
10 the house. She testified that she was privy to no 
11 conversations between my client and any of the other 
12 co-defendants concerning methamphetamine or the manufacture. 
13 She testified that she never saw drugs change hands, so she 
14 didn't corroborate anything. 
15 The Strike Force members simply placed my client in the 
16 vicinity of the lab at the time they raided the home. There 
17 was no corroboration as far as his actual physical 
18 possession of the lab equipment and, in fact, the evidence 
19 shows that there were well over 65 items of evidence that 
20 were taken, no fingerprints linking my client to it. And 
21 the only thing actually linking my client to the possession 
22 of this lab equipment or the precursor or anything that 
23 constitutes a crime in that basement was simply the 
24 testimony of the co-defendants. 
25 MR. SAUNDERS: I think there needs to be a 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
110 
distinction made about the direct evidence as well as the 
circumstantial evidence. Both types of evidence are allowed 
in court. There is plenty of circumstantial evidence to 
corroborate the testimony of these two co-defendants. I 
don't think it has to be a smoking gun, as Mr. Retallick 
would like to see, a fingerprint, somebody catching or 
possession. That isn't what is required. It is 
corroborated by circumstantial evidence. And for those 
reasons, I don't believe the instruction is warranted. 
THE COURT: Thank you. The Court declines to grant 
the instruction. I'll put it with the file so that it is 
clear. In fact, I'll just write here "denied." Put that 
hopefully with the file. 
The Court declines to give the instruction for the 
following reasons. The law provides in 77-17-7 that a 
defendant may be found guilty on the uncorroborated 
testimony of accomplice, however, such testimony should be 
viewed with caution -- or it goes on to say that such 
testimony should be viewed with caution. 
And then it goes on further to state under what 
circumstances the Court shall give an instruction. I don't 
believe that that is one of these cases for the reason that 
I view the statute as, in effect, addressing the situation 
where there are -- there are perhaps two people involved and 
one person's testimony against the other, and there being no 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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other corroborating evidence, so that one person is saying 
he did it and the other one person is saying he didn't. In 
that kind of an instance, I suppose that one should view 
with caution the testimony of an accomplice. 
In this case, however, we have several -- not just an 
accomplice, but several accomplices who are corroborating of 
each other and corroborating of the State's evidence. And, 
therefore, on that basis I don't know that it's appropriate. 
Further, in the Court's Instruction Number 16, I 
believe adequately protects the rights of the accused in 
providing the kind of guidance to the jury as it evaluates 
the accomplice testimony. In pertinent part it says, in 
judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the 
witnesses, you have a right to take into consideration any 
biases, any interest in the result, and any motive or lack 
of motive to testify fairly. 
And those kind of -- that kind of instruction lies at 
the very heart of this case and I think that it's giving the 
jury adequate instruction. 
All right. I think that does it. Let's go in and I'll 
let you argue to the jury. 
(WHEREUPON, at this time the conference in chambers 
concludes, after which proceedings resume in the hearing of 
the jury, as follows:) 
THE COURT: We appreciate your patience. In a few 
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ADDENDUM B 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
TESTIMONY OF AN ACCOMPLICE 
A defendant may be found guilty on the uncorroborated testimony of an 
accomplice; however, such testimony should be viewed with caution, and the 
jury should consider the motives of the accomplice and the benefits the 
accomplice may stand to gain by testifying*
 („ ^Ur^may credibility *^ \i^ 
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ADDENDUM C 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
If you believe any witness has willfully testified 
falsely as to any material matter, you may disregard the entire 
testimony of that witness, except as that witness may have been 
corroborated by other credible evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. It, 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight of the evidence. In judging the weight 
of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses, you have a 
right to take into consideration any biases, any interest in the 
result, and any motive or lack of motive to testify fairly. You 
may consider the witnesses1 conduct while testifying before you, 
the reasonableness of their statements, their apparent frankness 
or candor, or the want of it, their opportunity to know, their 
ability to understand, and their capacity to remember. You should 
consider these matters you believe have a bearing on the 
truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses1 statements. 
